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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In Africa since 1980, more than 30 countries have undertaken agricultural policy reforms as part
of broader structural adjustment programs.  Many advocates of market reform have argued that
the relaxation of controls on private trade and investment would raise productivity based on the
premises that (1) liberalized input and output markets would increase farm profitability by
increasing average output prices and reducing input costs, thereby spurring farm investments and
commercialization; and (2) farm investment and commercialization would lead to dynamic
changes throughout the economy to support structural transformation.  
However, the results of the reform programs have been mixed and frequently inconsistent with the
expected increases in productivity.  Using national-level data from Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Mali, Senegal, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, we found that partial measures of agricultural labor
productivity increased during the periods of sectoral reform in only three of seven cases; partial
measures of agricultural land productivity increased in four of seven cases.  These findings are
consistent with micro-level research findings indicating that in spite of major benefits achieved
through the elimination of former policy-related barriers to private investment in the food system,
there remain major institutional constraints in the prevailing economic-legal-contractual systems
of exchange that retard the potential for future development.
It is now being realized that the sectoral reform prescriptions have, in many cases, been based
upon only superficial knowledge of the prevailing economic institutions and how they affect
economic outcomes in particular economies.  There is also an emerging general consensus that
future productivity growth within the evolving market economies in Africa will require closer
attention to the institutional details of the system — i.e., going beyond generalizations that
property rights, market rules, and exchange mechanisms need to be defined and worked out, to
actually conducting pragmatic applied research on the specific kinds of property rights, rules, and
exchange arrangements that would most contribute to economic development under particular
country circumstances.  This implies a need for procedures of identifying and working out specific
property rights, commercial codes, market rules, and exchange arrangements most likely to
contribute to improved economic performance, given the values of people and circumstances of
the country. 
This paper reviews the emerging empirical record of agricultural marketing policy reform and
agricultural productivity, drawing from research on food access and agricultural productivity
supported by USAID’s Africa Bureau on seven countries in West, Eastern, and Southern Africa. 
We also examine key factors constraining past and future performance of the food systems in
these countries.  The paper concludes by identifying a set of policy issues for further consideration
that would help provide the investment incentives to promote productivity growth for the millions
of low-input semi-subsistence rural households in the region.iv
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Poor performance of economies characterized by direct government control over markets has
induced policy changes throughout the world regarding the role of government in economic
affairs. The ideology of the private enterprise - market economy has promoted transitions in many
economic systems, including widespread reform of agricultural marketing and pricing systems.  In
Africa since 1980, more than 30 countries have undertaken agricultural policy reforms as part of
broader structural adjustment programs (Donovan 1996; Jayne and Jones 1997; Seppälä 1997). 
While there remains substantial debate over the welfare effects of these reform programs, the
realities of fiscal and administrative constraints of most African governments have led to a
situation in which agricultural policy debates now center less on whether and where to apply
market-oriented prescriptions, and more on how to implement these policies.
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Many advocates of market reform have argued that the transition from an economy with
extensive, direct government controls to a market-based economy would raise productivity.  Their
arguments are usually as follows: (1) liberalized input and output markets would increase farm
profitability by increasing average output prices and reducing input costs, thereby spurring farm
investments and commercialization; and (2) farm investment and commercialization would lead to
dynamic changes throughout the economy to support structural transformation (e.g., Johnston
and Mellor 1961).  However, market economies have varied widely in their performance.  These
differences cannot be explained simply by the extent to which governments have stopped
“intervening in the market.”
The objective of this paper is to review the emerging empirical record of agricultural policy
reform and agricultural productivity in selected countries in Africa, to identify key factors that
account for variations in productivity growth across the newly-liberalizing food systems in these
countries, and to analyze how the availability of more productive agricultural technologies affects
the efficacy of policy reform.  The paper argues that a neglect of the institutional foundations of
market development has impeded productivity growth in African agriculture.  These limitations
are due in part to assumptions about how markets would develop, and due to failure to examine
the institutional underpinnings of these markets and hence the incentives (or lack thereof) for
investment and growth.  The paper concludes by identifying options for supporting productivity
growth and food security through strengthening the incentives to participate and invest in the
newly-liberalizing agricultural input and output markets in the region.  The paper focuses on
sectoral issues in agriculture, and acknowledges that macroeconomic policy changes, while not
explicitly addressed here, have also had major effects on the functioning of agricultural systems in
Africa.
The organization of the paper is as follows.  We first review the trends in agricultural production
and productivity during the post-reform period in the selected study countries.  The trends show
that response to agricultural policy reform has shown wide variability across countries, and that2
generalized conclusions about the impact of reform on productivity growth are unwarranted.
Section 3 identifies some of the factors accounting for the variations in performance across the
reformed agricultural systems in Africa.  Inadequate attention to key institutional design questions
arising from the transition to a market economy has maintained a situation of high transaction
costs and uncertainties in the coordination of input generation and distribution, farm credit, and
the various stages of commodity marketing in Africa.  Section 4 explores potential options for
promoting agricultural productivity growth through increased attention to the institutional details
of economic policy in a market economy.     
2 The impact of currency overvaluation on artificially cheapening rice prices was partially offset,
especially in Mali and Senegal, by taxation of rice imports both to protect local irrigated production (due to
the political importance of "drought-proofing" the Sahel) and to generate government revenues.
     
3 Jayne et al. (1995) describe the historical, political, and social processes that transformed white maize
from a minor crop into the main staple food of Eastern and Southern Africa over a period of less than six
decades.
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2.  TRENDS IN AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
2.1  Evolution of Agricultural Policy: Why Did the Reforms Occur?
Donor thinking on food policy was heavily influenced during the 1980s by the premise that
marketing boards in Africa generally depressed food production by taxing agriculture to support a
cheap food policy (see, for example, World Bank 1981; Cleaver 1985; Bates 1981).  This premise
was generally applicable to the coarse grain sectors of West and Central Africa and the non-maize
based regions of  Eastern Africa.  In these countries, sectoral policy was designed not primarily to
expand local coarse grain production but rather to capture a certain portion of it to meet urban
consumption needs.  Urban food security in many cases depended crucially in imported
commodities such as rice and wheat, leading to cheap food for privileged urban consumers and
low food prices for producers (Bates 1981).  Imported rice accounted for nearly half of the
calorie consumption in Ouagadougou in the mid-1980s (Reardon, Thiombiano, and Delgado
1988) and more than half the calories of urban Senegalese diets in 1996 (Diagana and Reardon
1997).  Moreover, exchange rate overvaluation made rice and especially wheat imports artificially
cheap in much of Francophone West Africa before 1994.
2
Food policy evolved in a fundamentally different way in much of Eastern and Southern Africa,
where settler agriculture was prominent during the colonial period.  In general, the greater the
importance of European agriculture during the colonial period, the greater the degree of state
intervention in food marketing activities, and the greater the subsidization of selected producers
(Jayne and Jones 1997).  The rise of politically powerful farm lobbies has figured prominently in
the determination of agricultural policy, which has in some respects benefitted smallholder as well
as European farming interests (Eicher 1995).  Also in contrast to West Africa, urban food security
depended more heavily on domestically-produced cereals, in particular white maize, which was
not readily available on world markets.
3  Post-independence food policy in these countries was
strongly driven by (a) the priority put on white maize self-sufficiency given the unreliability of
alternative sources; and (b) the implicit and sometimes explicit “social contract” that the post-
independence governments made with the African majority to redress the neglect of smallholder
agriculture and infrastructural development during the former colonial period.  As will be argued
below, the general predictions that policy reform and privatization would stimulate agricultural
production were less accurate in these Eastern and Southern African countries where domestic
cereal production was supported by state activities in credit, input, and output markets.
A common feature of agricultural policy in West, Eastern, and Southern Africa was the generation
of large budget deficits.  The state-led models of credit and input distribution and crop sale4
proved politically and economically unsustainable, particularly for food crops.  Fiscal crises and
increased donor leverage over domestic policy put agricultural reform on the structural
adjustment agenda in the 1980s.  After first trying to strengthen the performance of state
marketing boards in the 1960s and 1970s, donors and international lenders lost patience with
phased and partial reform programs that were increasingly seen as propping up costly and
otherwise unsustainable pricing and marketing policies rather than facilitating reform (Jones
1994).  In addition, political economy models (e.g., Bates 1981) suggested that state interventions
in agricultural markets, while ostensibly designed for rural development or to correct for market
failures, were often designed to serve the interests of a dominant elite composed of bureaucrats,
urban consumers, the military, and industry.  The framework of lending contingent upon
acceptance of policies proposed by lending agencies has strongly influenced the path of market
reform and has expanded external leverage over domestic agricultural policy through aid
conditionality.  More than any other factor, agricultural policy reform in Africa has generally been
undertaken as a response to fiscal crises and has rarely been initiated with strong domestic
political support. 
In part, the lack of initial enthusiasm for policy reform by African leaders probably reflected
doubts about how responsive the economy would be to these reforms.  In many countries, the
poor state of roads, irrigation, and other physical infrastructure combined with the lack of
varieties highly responsive to intensified input use have, in the past, limited supply response to
higher prices resulting from reforms, thereby dampening policymakers’ enthusiasm for further
reforms. (Binswanger 1990; Cleaver 1985; Barrett and Carter 1997; Staatz and Ba 1996).
Given the policy context, it is not surprising that in many cases the sectoral reforms as prescribed
by lenders and outside advisors have been only partially implemented and have been subjected to
frequent policy reversals.  In much of Eastern and Southern Africa, the state marketing boards
continue to operate and remain major players in the market.  In other cases, selected functions of
the abolished marketing boards are again being carried out by reconstituted public agencies, albeit
on a reduced scale, and agricultural price controls are still enforced in some countries.  The partial
implementation of the reforms underscores the need for caution in assessing the effects of sectoral
reform.  It should also be noted that many marketing boards and price policies were adopted in
response to real problems with existing systems, often related to food and income insecurity. 
Many of these problems remain, as do political demands for solutions to them.
2.2  Broad Trends in Agricultural Productivity Growth
Figures 1 through 7 present the trends in crop land and labor productivity for Burkina Faso,
Senegal, Mali, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  Land productivity is defined as the
inflation-adjusted value of crop output per hectare; labor productivity is defined as the inflation-5
Figure 1.  Zimbabwe:  Value of Crop Production per hectare and per agricultural laborer
(constant 1993 US$).
Figure 2.  Kenya:  Value of Crop Production per hectare and per person in rural areas
(constant 1993 US$).6
Figure 3.  Ethiopia:  Value of Crop Production per hectare and per agricultural laborer
(constant 1993 US$).
Figure 4. Zambia:  Value of Crop Production per hectare and per person in rural areas
(constant 1993 US$).7
Figure 5.  Mali:  Value of Crop Production per hectare and per person in rural areas
(constant 1993 US$).
Figure 6.  Senegal:   Value of Crop Production per hectare and per person in rural areas
(constant 1993 US$).     
4 Unfortunately, data is seldom available to measure total factor productivity in Africa (see Thirtle et al.
1993 for an exception), and there is also considerable disagreement about how TFP should be measured.
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Figure 7.  Burkina Faso:  Value of Crop Production per hectare and per person in rural
areas (constant 1993 US$).
adjusted value of crop output per rural person.  Three-year centered moving averages were
constructed from both series to smooth out the effects of random variations such as weather, and
then averaged in five-year segments as shown in Figures 1 through 7.  This procedure is similar to
that used by Block (1994).  Annex 1 provides details on data sources and units.
A movement in the coordinates over time from the lower-left to the upper-right portion of the
figures represents increases in both land and labor productivity.  Movement from the upper-right
to lower-left parts of the figure represents a decline in both productivity measures.  Note that in
these figures, increases in these measures of partial productivity can occur from either shifts in
crop mix (e.g., from millet to higher-valued cotton) or from increases in crop output per unit of
input, or both.  Discussions about single factor productivity can be misleading if interpreted as
total factor productivity.  On the input side, improvements in labor and land productivity are due
to changes in other inputs.  New technology, infrastructure, extension, supplies of other inputs
(water, for example) are not costless and need to be taken into account in assessing total factor
productivity (TFP).
4  On the output side, the mix of farm and nonfarm activities undertaken by the
rural population may have shifted over time.  For example, if a larger percentage of rural
households’ time has gone into nonfarm activities over time, the analysis presented in the figures     
5 A more accurate indicator of labor productivity would have been value of crop output per unit of
agricultural laborer, but time series data on agricultural labor was unavailable in most cases.  Use of rural
population data will give similar trend results to those using agricultural labor data as long as the
proportion of rural population engaged in agriculture was relatively constant over the sample period. 
Productivity trends will be biased upward (downward) if the share of the rural population in agriculture
increased (decreased) over the sample period.
     
6 In Mali, for example, the reform of the state’s role in the management of irrigated rice production and
rehabilitation of rice perimeters increased the returns to fertilizer application on irrigated rice despite the
elimination of 15% to 25% subsidies on the value of fertilizer (Cisse 1997).
     
7 However, if fertilizer distributed concessionally to smallholders is counted, fertilizer use actually
increased in Zimbabwe by 13% in the post-reform period.
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will understate increases (or overstate decreases) in agricultural labor productivity (Kelly et al.
1995).
5  Nonetheless, the measures of labor and land productivity can indicate important changes
in agricultural systems performance, especially if kept in context of the changes in the use of other
factors.
The figures highlight several apparent trends.
￿ Land and labor productivity have increased between the 1985-89 period and the 1990-95
period in three of the seven countries examined:  Ethiopia, Mali, and Burkina Faso
(Figures 3, 5, and 7).  By 1991, major food and input market reforms had been initiated in
each of these countries.  The rise in land and labor productivity has been associated with
increased use of fertilizer in each of these countries (by 260% in Ethiopia, 61% in Burkina
Faso, and 17% in Mali) between 1980-89 and 1990-95.  The increase in fertilizer use in
Ethiopia has occurred under the continuation of subsidized state input distribution (until
1997) and alleged restrictions on private investment.  In Mali and Burkina Faso, however,
fertilizer use rose despite the elimination of fertilizer subsidies in part because of policy
reform, crop productivity improvements and increases in world prices that served to raise
the returns to rice and cotton production.
6
In some of these cases, e.g., Ethiopia, the restrictions imposed on producers and
marketing agents during the control period depressed investment incentives so much that
the simple elimination of these restrictions increased agricultural growth.  However, as
argued later, the emerging market-oriented systems of farm finance, input delivery and
commodity marketing also suffer from a number of unresolved constraints that impede the
potential for future productivity growth. 
￿ Land and labor productivity both declined during the 1990-95 period in three countries:
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Senegal (Figures 1, 4, and 6).  Fertilizer sales to smallholders
declined by 25%, 17%, and 15% in these countries,
7 respectively, between the 1985-89
and 1990-95 period.  In each of these cases, the reforms were associated with the
withdrawal of state support to key producers in the form of input subsidies, concessional     
8 These incentives were to some extent eroded by currency overvaluation (see e.g., Quiroz and Valdes
1993; Jansen and Muir 1994).
     
9 Examples include the World Bank’s insistence that consumer subsidies on maize meal be eliminated
before Zimbabwe received additional structural adjustment loans in 1993.
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credit, and output price incentives, especially for rice production in Senegal and white
maize production in Zimbabwe and Zambia (Wilcock et al. 1997; Randolph 1997; Mosley
1994; Howard and Mungoma 1997).  Smallholders in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Zambia have
been affected by a withdrawal of state buying stations (Mosley 1994; Jayne et al. 1994;
Howard and Mungoma 1997).  In fact, the “smallholder green revolutions” achieved
temporarily in the 1980s in parts of the region (see Eicher 1995; Byerlee and Eicher 1997)
featured state-led investments in input delivery, credit disbursement and major expansion
of state crop buying stations, which increased incentives to adopt new high-yielding seed
varieties.
8  These factors partially explain the dramatic increases in land and labor
productivity exhibited in Zimbabwe and Zambia between the 1980-84 period and the
1985-89 period (see Figures 1 and 4).  However, this state-led model of service provision
to smallholders has proven politically and economically unsustainable (Howard and
Mungoma 1997; Jayne et al. 1994).  The budgetary deficits incurred through these state-
led agricultural policies contributed to the macroeconomic crises that allowed donors to
exert control over agricultural policy formation under structural adjustment lending
programs.
9  Privatized systems of fertilizer marketing to smallholders in much of Southern
Africa are constrained by climatic risk, underdeveloped credit markets, lack of responsive
varieties for drought-prone areas, high transport costs, risky output markets, and lack of
technical/management skills and information (Rusike et al. 1997).  In Senegal, Kelly et al.
(1996) found that liberalization has improved cereal marketing efficiency. The production
impact has been small because peanuts (that have a controlled market) still provide greater
profits and more predictable markets.
￿ Land productivity generally increased more rapidly (or declined less rapidly) than labor
productivity in most countries examined since 1990.  This is because the rural population
continues to grow at an average of 3% per year while the area cultivated is almost
stagnant in most countries due to constraints on the availability of additional fertile land. 
There has also been a shift in population over the past two decades from the
agroclimatically unfavorable to favorable zones in the Sahel. This may partially account for
apparent increases in land productivity, in addition to the shift in crop mix from coarse
grains to higher-valued cotton.
￿ Mixed record of grain production growth: Grain production has declined since the reforms
were implemented in almost all the former UK-colony countries of Eastern and Southern
Africa (Table 1).  Since the mid-1980s, population growth has outstripped grain
production growth in most of Eastern and Southern Africa (Table 1, column b).  Even in
absolute terms, grain production during the 1990-1995 period is lower than in the 1980s     
10 Some of the food output decline in the 1990-94 period can been attributed to the 1992 drought, the
worst in decades.  But when the effects of the drought are removed (see note a, Table 1), the general picture
remains intact, and clarifies that the decline is not simply a transitory phenomenon due to drought.  
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in most countries.
10  The stagnation in yields and per capita production is especially
noteworthy in Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Zambia, where smallholders’ use of improved maize
hybrids and fertilizer per hectare are the highest in Africa.
However, grain production per capita is increasing in countries such as Ethiopia, Mali, and
Uganda.  Each of these countries has implemented important macroeconomic and sectoral
policy reforms over the past decade, but not clearly more so than the other countries listed
in Table 1, where performance has been very mixed.  Our conclusion is  that the weight of
the evidence indicates that there is a moderately positive but highly  variable correlation
between agricultural performance and the extent to which countries have followed donor
specified sectoral and macroeconomic policy adjustments.  The most important (but only
partial) determinant of the response of agriculture to reform has been the extent to which
agriculture was supported or depressed prior to reform.  In countries where state activities
clearly depressed agricultural production prior to reform (as in Ethiopia and Mali),
agricultural productivity growth in the reform period has been encouraging, despite the
fact that numerous policy and institutional barriers to productivity growth still need to be
resolved.  These policy/institutional barriers are examined in Section 3.  By contrast, in
countries where smallholder grain production was, on net, supported by state intervention
(as in Zimbabwe and Kenya), agricultural productivity has been stagnant in the post-
reform period, despite the fact that certain aspects of reform have been clearly growth-
promoting (Jayne and Jones 1997; Jayne and Argwings-Kodhek 1997).  In addition, the
supply response to sectoral and macroeconomic policy reform seems to have been greatest
in those countries where the reforms were coupled with long-term investments in
agricultural technology and human capital development. For example, Savadogo,
Reardon, and Pietola (1995) show that prior investments in animal traction and access to
infrastructure were important determinants of farmers’ supply responsiveness to output
prices in Burkina Faso.
￿ Price instability:  The transition from state-controlled grain prices to market-oriented
prices has exacerbated intra-annual and inter-annual price instability in some countries
(Barrett and Carter 1997; Kangasniemi et al. 1993).  The magnitude of price instability 12









































































































































































































afigures in parentheses exclude the 1992 drought year.  
bfigures for South Africa are for maize only.  The share of maize in
total coarse grain production during the 1980-1989 period was estimated at 91% in Zimbabwe, 98% for Malawi, 95% for
Zambia, 92% for Kenya, and 94% for South Africa (USDA 1992).  Sources:  Population data:  Urban and Nightingale (1993). 
Grain data:  Min. Agric. data files (Zimbabwe); Jones 1994 (Zambia); Min. Agric. data files, compliments of J. Rusike (Malawi);
Egerton University, Policy Analysis Matrix database (Kenya); FAO Production, Trade, and Fertilizer Yearbooks (Tanzania);
Maize Board, various years, and RSA 1994 (South Africa).13
can be especially serious in landlocked areas that fluctuate from grain surplus to grain
deficit according to weather conditions, and face high transport costs to other regional and
international markets.
In spite of the strong rationale for moderating extreme price fluctuation, the marketing
board "buyer and seller of last resort" approach has not emerged as a successful model in
the prevailing market environment.  First, this system exposes the state to larger trading
deficits in a liberalized market environment than in a strongly controlled one if floor and
ceiling prices are not constantly adjusted according to prevailing market conditions
(Kangasniemi et al. 1993;  Pinckney 1993).  In several cases marketing board deficits
actually increased after the reforms were initiated (Jayne and Jones 1997).  Second,
stabilization schemes have impeded private investment in the marketing system by
dampening spatial and temporal price variation and by the unpredictable and uneven
implementation of these schemes.  Third, there remains an unresolved conflict between the
marketing boards’ commercial objectives (implying a withdrawal from unprofitable
activities) and their social objectives (implying engaging in unprofitable activities that the
private sector will not undertake, such as the “buyer and seller of last resort” approach in
remote areas to stabilize prices).  The failure of the policy process in the post-reform
period to separate the boards’ social functions (including price stabilization) from their
commercial activities has often resulted in the boards taking steps to improve their
financial trading account in ways that exacerbate market uncertainty rather than reduce it.
Moreover, macroeconomic policies such as devaluation can increase the average return to
investment (if the farmgate price increase outweighs the increase in cost due to more
expensive imported inputs), but would not alone reduce the variability of returns due to
rainfall instability, and hence reduce the risk of investment (Reardon et al. 1995).  Thus
the expected increase in farm investment may not occur.  Devaluation could even increase
risk by increasing transportation costs, so that prices in production areas will be
determined locally and thus be more unstable.
2.3  The Challenge  
Although there is some evidence that output marketing reforms have been associated with
increases in land and labor productivity at the aggregate level in the countries studied, much of
these increases are due to shifts in crop mix and the geographical location of production rather
than the intensification of existing farming systems (Block 1994; Dioné et al. 1996; Savadogo,
Reardon, and Pietola 1995).  Crop mix shifts have often been toward crops whose output markets
were not liberalized (e.g., cotton in Burkina Faso, peanuts in Senegal, coffee in Rwanda). 
However, this does not imply that cash cropping incentives have not benefitted from marketing
policy reform in key subsistence crop sectors.  Jayne (1994) and Goetz (1993) have shown that
the ability to ensure reliable and low-cost food for rural households as purchasers of food is an
important determinant of their ability to diversify into higher-valued nonfood crops.  And the
evidence across Africa indicates that food marketing reform has indeed reduced marketing costs
for consumers (Staatz and Dembélé 1992; Sasaki 1995; Jayne et al. 1996; Asfaw and Jayne 1997).     
11 A notable exception is rice in Mali's Office du Niger zone, where liberalization of output marketing
and processing, combined with decentralization of management of irrigation perimeters, have led to
substantial intensification and production increases (Cisse 1997).
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Notwithstanding the importance of agricultural productivity growth through shifts in crop
composition, there is less evidence that food marketing reform has promoted intensification of the
key food crops that constitute the bulk of area cultivated in Africa.
11  A major challenge,
therefore,  is to design input and output marketing systems that support sustainable increases in
farm productivity growth for the millions of low-input semi-subsistence rural households that
can’t move and have limited capacity to change their crop mix.  Policy reform needs to expand its
focus from liberalizing markets to solving the broader problem of how to induce technical
innovation and productivity growth to support structural transformation (Staatz and Ba 1996;
Jayne and Jones 1997;  Reardon et al. 1996; Reardon et al. 1997).
So far, agricultural marketing reforms have replaced often unreliable, high-cost, and centralized
forms of state marketing with more open markets that may be competitive but often lacking in
information, infrastructure, and are poorly integrated with other key activities.  On the input side,
financial market failures restrict farmers’ access to credit and thus constrain the demand for
productivity-enhancing inputs, which in turn limits private investment in input production and
delivery systems (especially serving remote areas).  Poor information available to farmers and
many traders about fertilizer types, qualities and application rates, weak coordination between
importers, wholesalers, and retailers, and levels of scale/scope that are insufficient to reduce unit
costs all depress the use of productivity-enhancing modern inputs.  These problems have led to a
contraction of fertilizer use in smallholder areas, for example, in Burkina Faso (Dembélé and
Savadogo 1996) and in Zimbabwe and Zambia (Rusike et al. 1997).  Moreover, because of the
elimination of state credit services to smallholders and because of the continuing weaknesses of
informal credit markets in semi-arid Africa (Christensen 1989), farmers who have the cash on
hand for fertilizer and seed are either: (1) those with nonfarm sources of cash income, which
relieves the credit constraint (e.g., see Reardon, Crawford, and Kelly 1994 for African evidence;
Kelly et al. 1996 for Senegal; Savadogo, Reardon, and Pietola 1995 for Burkina Faso; and Clay et
al. 1995 for Rwanda); or (2) in a cash-crop scheme where the farmer generates a sure source of
cash income and can often acquire  inputs on credit from the cash crop program to use partially
on food crops (such as in the case of coffee in Rwanda, see Clay et al. 1995; and cotton in Mali,
see Dioné 1989).
The foregoing assessment generally indicates that the transition from controlled production and
distribution systems to more market-oriented economies has had widely variable effects on
investment incentives and economic performance.  While policy reform has created modest
successes in some cases, the newly-emerging food systems in most African countries have failed
to produce the anticipated stimulus to agricultural growth and rural welfare.  This conclusion  is
consistent with the assessment of Latin America by de Janvry, Key, and Sadoulet (1997).  As
Reardon et al. (1995) noted, the notion of “getting prices right” has been insufficient to
dramatically raise farm productivity, and thus "the debate should be reopened on identifying cost-15
effective ways of increasing access to inputs, through improving the delivery of inputs and
enabling farmers to acquire the means to pay for them” (p. 23).
There is increasing recognition that the general prescriptions promoting “liberalization” over the
past two decades have been made and implemented with insufficient knowledge and analysis of
how specific market institutions were affecting economic outcomes (e.g., World Bank 1997). 
There is also an emerging general consensus that future productivity growth within the evolving
market economies of developing areas will require closer attention to the institutional details of
the system — i.e., going beyond the truisms that property rights, market rules, and exchange
mechanisms need to be defined and worked out, to actually conducting pragmatic applied
research on the specific property rights, rules, and exchange arrangements that would most
contribute to economic development under particular country circumstances (Schmid 1992).17
3.  BASIC CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: HOW INSTITUTIONS MAKE A
DIFFERENCE
The functioning of the food system and allied legal and commercial systems may affect farm
productivity via several pathways: (1) by affecting the costs and risks of making investments in
the food system that raise land and labor productivity; (2) by affecting the costs and risks of
production and sale of crop output, which may induce investment in farm capital and use of
complementary variable inputs; and (3) reducing costs in one market (e.g., for food) may induce
shifts in crop composition toward higher-valued crops and greater commercialization, which is
usually associated with increased demand for management skills and knowledge, which in turn
increase efficiency (Schultz 1978).  To the extent that technical innovation is demand-driven and
is responsive to market signals (as suggested by Hayami and Ruttan 1985), changes in agricultural
input and output prices may have longer run effects on the types of technology generated.  For
example, research on urban consumption patterns for coarse grains has led to insights about the
attributes that breeders need to stress in their selection strategies (Boughton et al. 1995).
Institutions are the rules, laws, norms of behavior, ideology, and their enforcement characteristics
that structure the behavior of individuals and firms in the economic system.  Institutions are the
rules of the game; organizations are the players.  Together they define the incentive structure of
societies and economies (North 1994).  Institutions and the technology employed determine the
transaction and transformation costs that determine the costs of production.  In situations where
exchange is risky and costly, trade tends to adapt in ways that reduce such risks (such as trade
within kinship group networks) but in so doing limit the scope of the market and hence impede
the development of more efficient production processes relying on specialization and scale
economies (Robison and Siles 1997).  While a specific goal of policy is to reduce marketing costs,
the evolution of more productive economies over the past two-hundred years has featured the
development of more complex and costly marketing and contracting arrangements but which has
promoted investment in more technically efficient production processes (North 1994).  The
evolution of more productive economic systems may involve higher marketing costs, not less.  In
this regard, marketing systems performance should be evaluated not solely to the extent that costs
of the existing system are minimized (a static approach).  One needs to consider those costs in
relation to the set of services provided, and the effect of these services on technical innovation
and productivity growth throughout the food system.  For example, a complex contracting
mechanism between a supplier and buyer of a given product may involve high costs in terms of
negotiation, legal services, monitoring, and related public resources to resolve contract disputes if
necessary. Such mechanisms may provide the stability of returns to justify major investments in
new technology that lead to productivity gains at other stages of the food system.
The situation of relatively low levels of productivity in Africa coexisting with the widespread use
of technical knowledge in many other parts of the world indicates the need for attention to the
barriers to the adoption of productivity-enhancing inputs in African food and agricultural systems. 
From the point of view of the individual peasant or other market participant, it is clearly not a
single problem or factor that describes the opportunity set.  It is a system.  Individuals have
limited capacity to deal with the circle of poverty alone.  The problems seem to lie in the
economic environment which structures economic incentives: constraints and opportunities.  A18
major barrier to investment, especially in innovative methods and inputs, is the problem of the
missing input or market, and of selective market failure (de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet
1991).
Before going into more detailed discussion of the institutional aspects of traditional marketing
systems, it will be useful to define a few terms that will be used in this section:
Market rules are the regulations that individuals are expected to abide by when engaging in
market exchange.  In addition to the state, market rules may originate from trade organizations,
community norms, and ideological beliefs.  An example of a market rule in Michigan is the
regulation prohibiting a fruit seller from misleading the buyer by putting all the good fruit on the
top of the container.  This practice is called “facing,”  and the rule prohibiting it is intended to
regulate the actions of sellers in order to reduce the transaction costs of exchange.  Without rules
against “facing,” exchange would require visual inspection of the product.  The need for visual
inspection inhibits trading remotely by product specification, thus raising transaction costs of
exchange for both buyer and seller and reducing volumes traded.
Property rights define rights and obligations in using and exchanging goods and services.  Using
the above example, the rule against “facing” protects buyers with the right to view product quality
without having to incur the costs of inspecting the hidden parts of the container.  Notice that
property rights are also a form of regulation.  By conferring a right to the buyer, they regulate the
behavior of the seller.  Regulation is therefore not the opposite of freedom.  A right for you
creates an obligation for me.  The right presumably makes my behavior more predictable for you,
and may raise your incentive to invest in producing something to trade.  Without market rules and
property rights to create a reasonable degree of confidence about the behavior of potential trading
partners, no market activity would be possible.  The common prescription that governments
should define property rights and that governments should not regulate markets represents a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of markets. Without regulation, there would be no
market.  The existence of rights implies some governance system, but not necessarily formal
government.
Exchange arrangements specify the terms and modes by which trade takes place.  There are
numerous potential exchange arrangements that can occur within a market economy.  Examples
of exchange arrangements include private negotiation in spot markets, auctions, forward contracts
specifying price, product quality, delivery date and location (etc.), and futures contracts.  In many
developing areas, non-monetary arrangements involving the exchange of food for labor or land
are common.
Using these concepts, we now turn to an analysis of how the details of institutional design in
market reform programs affect productivity growth in African agriculture.  19
4.  BEYOND LIBERALIZATION: ADDRESSING THE INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS OF
MARKET DEVELOPMENT
Market liberalization is not an end in itself.  Schultz's "efficient but poor" observation of low-
resource farmers also describes the functioning of firms, markets, and entire economies in many
developing areas (Shaffer et al. 1985).  Marketing margins may approximate costs, but these costs
may be too high and unstable to encourage rapid private investment in the marketing system to
promote on-farm productivity growth.  A market can be efficient and still result in poverty.  The
institutional challenges in alleviating poverty over the long run can be seen by contrasting
marketing systems in high-income countries like the U.S. with those in sub-Saharan Africa.  In
many high-income countries, policies and infrastructure have lowered the risks and transaction
costs of engaging in commercialized agriculture through:
￿ futures and options markets to shift and absorb market risks associated with production
and investment;
￿ commodity exchanges to enable participants to lock-in quantities for sale or purchase to
facilitate advance planning in production decisions;
￿ specialized insurance to reduce many types of risks;
￿ low-cost market information accessible on a daily basis, linked to national and global
information systems utilizing modern communication technology;
￿ large volumes handled by marketing and processing firms, which allow them to spread
their fixed costs and hence reduce the risks of sunk-cost investments;
￿ globalized trading networks to reduce covariant supply  risks and reduce search costs;
￿ well-specified grades and standards to allow for remote contracting by commodity
specification rather than by visual inspection;
￿ sophisticated contracting arrangements that reduce the risks of specialized investments
with large sunk costs by locking-in the terms of exchange over a relatively long time
period;
￿ well-established legal systems to accommodate more sophisticated contracting
arrangements and contract disputes;
￿ rules addressing  problems of concentration of wealth and power (e.g., antitrust
legislation);
￿ rights of farmers to organize to act collectively in the market and politically;
￿ the establishment of collateral to encourage the development of credit systems; and
￿ competitive financial systems serving rural areas to reduce credit-related constraints on
crop input use; local financial intermediaries linked to, and having access to, international
capital.
By contrast, agricultural marketing systems in most of Africa are generally characterized by the
following:
￿ Primary forms of exchange involving high transaction costs, such as private haggling in
spot markets over small volumes. These costly exchange procedures reduce incentives to
invest in specialized production processes by reducing the profitability of production for
the market.20
￿ Use of personalized trading networks.  This reduces transaction costs of exchange, but
limit the scope of the market.  Marketing systems that fail to reduce the uncertainties and
potential opportunism of trading gives rise to alternative trade networks based on
personalized kinship ties.  Trade based on kinship ties tend to succeed in minimizing
transaction costs of exchange.  But because they limit the scope of trading activity,
marketing systems based on personalized trade ties reinforce semi-subsistence production
patterns with high production costs (Robison and Siles 1997; North 1985).
￿ Semi-subsistence agricultural structure (a small percentage of production is marketed),
leading to wide fluctuations in volumes traded and prices according to the weather. 
Markets tend to be thinly traded due to semi-subsistence production patterns, which in
turn attracts few buyers.  Poor transport and communications also restrict the scope of the
market.  Small variations in total supplies have large effects on marketed volumes and
hence on prices.  Price uncertainty increases the risk of commercialized production and
thus reinforces the incentives to engage in subsistence agriculture.
Subsistence farm families are typically not specialized in farming but produce a multitude
of consumer goods and farm inputs.  Diversification can be a strength of a system where
markets are risky, but it can be a barrier to an improved system. Increased productivity
requires specialization, division of labor, and investment in technological inputs (which
often require a larger scale of operation to be productive and profitable).  Specialization
requires greater coordination between the production of farm inputs, farming, assembly,
processing, storage, transport and wholesaling, and retailing.  More sophisticated
exchange arrangements (e.g., contingent contracts — those that specify partner
obligations and rights contingent upon a future outcome like the weather or price level)
arise to reduce the risks and transaction costs of participating in more specialized
production patterns.  Coordination becomes increasingly critical to performance.  It is the
particular institutions of the system — rules, exchange arrangements, property rights, etc.
— that facilitate or inhibit effective coordination in complex sequences of production and
distribution.
This problem is exemplified by Ethiopia’s food price instability problem.  With 80% of a
normal crop of grains consumed on farms, a 20% increase in output increases potential
domestic  marketed supply by 100%.  Price fluctuations can be very large and political
pressure develops to do something about price instability.  Uncertain future grain prices
reduce the demand for inputs, which in turn constrains the development of coordinated
systems of farm credit and input supply.  Although a major increase in fertilizer use would
most likely promote farm productivity and food security, fertilizer use in the current
system is constrained by failure to develop institutional arrangements for dealing with the
price and output risks of farmers, risks of nonrepayment of credit for lenders, and the
resulting risks to input suppliers of holding unsalable inventories.   An attempt in 1996 to
solve the problem through marketing board support prices was ineffective and expensive     
12 For a similar analysis for Mali, see Staatz, Dioné, and Dembélé (1989).
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(Alemu and Jayne 1997).
12  Analysis shows that better managing of food aid and
facilitating regional and international trade could reduce the price instability (Tschirley and
Weber 1996).
￿ High market risks and ineffective coordination depress incentives to invest in
productivity-enhancing technology. When the market environment is risky (e.g., because
of uncertainty over future government actions), traders and potential marketing agents do
not perceive it to be profitable to invest in developing either reliable markets or inputs for
small farmers.  The poverty trap is reinforced.  Markets remain thin and risky.  Each
participant works hard in his or her own perceived interest, prices are more or less
competitive, but the aggregate consequences are much less production and consumption
than the system could provide with greater specialization and improved coordination.
Uncertainty and transaction costs limit trade and investment, particularly investments with
high sunk costs, and reinforce subsistence production patterns.  The rate of technical
change and productivity growth is not simply a function of available technology, but
equally important are institutions sufficient to reduce the risks and transaction costs of
exchange to make investment in new technology profitable (Boughton et al. 1995).  This
is the task currently being faced by the Sasakawa-Global 2000 programs implemented in
several African countries.  A major contribution of the SG-2000 programs has been to
demonstrate that smallholder food production can grow rapidly if given a conducive set of
incentives, including access to a viable technical package, credit, and management
information.  However, the SG-2000 experiments have also demonstrated the transience
of such growth if input delivery, credit access, and output markets cannot be coordinated
in a sustainable manner (Putterman 1995).  Greater attention to the institutional details and
coordination mechanisms and their interactions with technology is crucial to develop
markets so that they act as a catalyst to farm technology investment and productivity
growth.  
Such coordination will become even more critical as research information becomes more
and more important in the generation of agricultural products.  The rising importance of
biotechnology in agriculture is creating a variety of new functions in the vertical system
for applying new scientific discoveries toward practical use in the food and fiber system. 
Such applications will require working out intellectual property rights for the product that
balance  the need for allowing creators of new material to capture adequate returns to
maintain incentives with the desire to minimize the capturing of windfall profits through
exclusion of competition over the long run (Zilberman, Yarkin, and Heiman 1997).  The
competitiveness of African farmers may increasingly depend on the ability of local research
and marketing systems to utilize, adapt and distribute newly engineered agricultural
material.  An important implication for research is that social scientists and technical
scientists need to work together from the beginning in the design and diffusion of
“improved technology” (Staatz 1989; Reardon 1989; Boughton et al. 1995).22
￿ Property rights and their enforcement are often uncertain. Contracting arrangements and
contract enforcement become more important as firms increase their reliance on more
capital-intensive, specialized, and productive production processes.  Property rights
established by state government and local traditional hierarchies are often in conflict, with
uncertain procedures for resolving the competing jurisdictional boundaries.  Gray areas in
the structure of property rights leave room for economic outcomes to be determined by 
power relations and opportunistic behavior.  This creates riskiness that impedes
investment.
For example, what rights do lender and borrower have if an investment fails?  What are
the rules for allocating credit among potential borrowers?  If an agricultural input is
purchased on credit, is the credit contract enforced if the purchased input was not what
was promised?  Different ways of resolving these questions affect costs and thus the
amount of credit supplied and demanded, with implications for input use and agricultural
productivity.  Foreign investors and firms can make great contributions to agricultural
systems.  What are the  rules that will promote foreign investment and at the same time
protect against exploitation?  The solution is in the details.
￿ Limited vertical coordination or integration between input delivery, farm finance, and
crop sale.  Most grain traders tend to be passive, accepting the surpluses that farmers
bring to their store rather than identifying potential markets and then actively promoting
production to supply them (Shaffer et al. 1985).  Larger-scale assembly-wholesaler firms
would find it in their interest to link farmers and retailers, providing both groups much
needed services, technical inputs and credit, and, most important, reliable markets. 
However, such coordination is limited by many problems in relationships including lack of
trust, opportunistic behavior and the absence of governance institutions that define
unacceptable business practices and provide low-cost enforcement of contracts.  For
example, farmers are not in a position to determine the composition of the material in a
bag of fertilizer.  What is the most effective method of assuring they get what they pay
for?  Sue the distributor in court?  Provide a national inspection service?  Have extension
agents offer testing services?  Promote competition with advertising and branded
products?  All of these options require government or another collective agency to
provide a “public goods” role.  But without analysis of the alternatives, we have little
information to guide policymakers in what may be the most effective way to develop these
markets. 
￿ Limited public market information makes planning difficult.  Some kinds of exchange
arrangements, e.g., futures markets, produce public market information about the future,
which enable individuals to shift risks.  When acquiring information on market conditions
is costly (e.g., due to poor communication infrastructures or missing markets), this leads
to asymmetric information across market participants and incomplete specification of
property rights and enforcement.23
￿ Limited product grades and standards contribute to higher transaction costs of market
exchange by requiring traders to visually inspect the product rather than contracting
remotely by product specification.
￿ Implicit caveat emptor (“let the buyer beware”) rules in which failure to detect product
quality deterioration is a cost incurred by the buyer.  This implicit rule tends to increase
the potential for opportunism in exchange, which imposes additional transaction costs of
trading.  In general, not being able to trust participants in the marketing system adds
greatly to marketing costs, restricts the use of markets, and thus limits opportunities
(Shaffer et al. 1985).
￿ Transport constraints.  A considerable part of the food price instability problem in Africa
is related to the high cost of transportation, which makes import parity prices two to four
times higher than export parity prices in much of the region (Koester 1986).  For example,
the cost of sending a ton of white maize by rail from the Northwest Province in South
Africa to the Copperbelt of Zambia is about $90, roughly the amount that South African
farmers are paid to grow it (Scott 1995).  Both the productivity and stability of the food
systems in the region could be substantially improved by public investments and policy
changes that reduce the costs of distribution — internally, between countries in the region,
and with the wider world market (Antle 1983).  Transport constraints also contribute to
temporary market concentration.  Small traders who must wait two weeks after buying
products to secure transport have their working capital tied up in inventory.  This allows
relatively large traders (who have greater liquidity) to temporarily exert greater influence
over the market (Gebremeskel, Jayne, and Shaffer 1997).
￿ Institutional constraints in linking African farmers to foreign markets.  With inelastic
demand in local markets, African agriculture faces the dilemma that success in raising
agricultural production would jeopardize continued profitability  through a drop in output
prices (Delgado 1992).  Trade offers the potential to expand agricultural production
without depressing domestic output prices, a key issue in sustaining long-run profitability
and productivity in the sector.  Penetration into global markets is increasingly tied to
understanding the complexities of food laws in major importing countries.  African-based
agribusiness and processing firms need to understand and comply with the proliferating
and continuously changing pattern of laws controlling food import into the North
American, European, and Asian markets.
Moreover, African agribusiness firms will increasingly need to establish partnerships with
firms operating in potential importing countries to ensure demand for their products. 
Multinational firms have a major advantage in international trade in that resources can be
devoted to assembling the product in the country of production (i.e., invest in the complex
coordination of input supply, production, processing, and marketing) with the assurance of
a subsidiary distributor with established access to retail markets in the importing country. 
Developing a vertically coordinated system of  production/marketing that bridges across
countries substantially reduces the risks and costs of engaging in international trade.24
￿ Intersection between fiscal policy and market institutions.  Food policies in most African
countries are strongly influenced by the basic need of the state to raise public revenues. 
Given the low levels of literacy, administrative capacity, and written records concerning
earnings and land ownership, most African governments rely heavily on indirect taxes
(especially import and export levies and license fees) to finance their operations.  In Mali,
Senegal, and Côte d'Ivoire, for example, import taxes on rice have been a major source of
government income.  Decisions to import may be driven more by the immediate financial
needs of the state than by market conditions within the country.  Calls for reforms of
marketing policies (e.g., abolishing trade taxes at grain checkpoints) that fail to account
for the basic need of governments to finance themselves are likely to be ignored by hard-
pressed officials unless accompanied by workable alternatives for raising revenue.
The coffee board in Rwanda is another example.  It was used to promote coffee
production and export and to generate revenue and foreign exchange controlled by the
government. External  economic advisors generally opposed the board and taxing of
exports.  At the same time, advisors recommended programs to promote health, education
and infrastructure.  Coffee export taxes were one of the few practical sources of
government revenue to finance such programs.  The problems arose with the details of the
operation of the coffee board and the government's diversion of the funds from
development projects to expenditures on arms and other interests of the political
authorities (Tardiff-Douglin and Shaffer 1994).
Abolishing such indirect taxation could also hurt the private sector if it led to reduced
expenditures on market infrastructures and delays in the payment of public salaries. 
Deteriorating infrastructures increase marketing costs.  Failure to pay public employees on
time can dramatically reduce urban effective demand for basic staples and soak up much of
the informal credit in the marketing system that otherwise would finance working capital
(Staatz, Dioné, and Dembélé 1989).  Experience throughout Africa has also shown that
when public employees are not paid on time or are not paid a living wage, they frequently
use their positions to extract bribes that greatly increase the transaction costs of
marketing.  Hence, a major challenge is to fashion reforms that reduce perverse incentives
on marketing agents while still providing the state with a workable means of financing its
legitimate operations.
￿ Collaboration between policy and research.  A key challenge in many African countries is
to build the tradition of researchers working collaboratively with policymakers to identify
ways of spurring productivity growth.  Building this tradition requires recognition by
policymakers that "facts make a difference" and that not all conventional wisdom about
the food system is necessarily true.  It also requires that researchers take seriously the
political-economic constraints often facing policymakers.  Local researchers have
sometimes been perceived by governments as hostile critics, more interested in exposing
weaknesses in policy than in working to constructively identify useful alternatives.  On the
other hand, researchers have sometimes been harassed, sacked, or killed for going public
with research results considered offensive to the state.  The historical lack of collaboration25
between government and university researchers frequently seen in many developing areas
inhibits local research solutions to contemporary policy problems.
The ability of ongoing local research to inform policy in a timely way is illustrated by the
government of Rwanda's decision to not implement an intended support price policy for
beans after research results indicated that most Rwandan farmers were net bean buyers
and that much of the local bean supply was imported informally from neighboring
countries (Loveridge 1991).  The generation of demand-driven policy analysis has been
illustrated in Zimbabwe by President Mugabe's call for analysis on how to expand the role
of small-scale maize mills, largely in response to applied research within the government
and at the University of Zimbabwe.
￿ Importance of beliefs and ideology in affecting economic performance. Peoples’
subjective experiences shape how they see the world.  Persistent views of private
marketing agents as exploitative or uninterested in responding to liberalization have
contributed in some countries to a “chicken and egg” dilemma, in which traders are
reluctant to invest further in the marketing system for fear of government intervention in
storage and pricing. Governments are reluctant to withdraw from the market for fear that
the private sector will not respond to adequately stabilize the system.  Maize trade in
Kenya has featured a policy of legalized private cross-border trade, followed by an import
ban, an export ban, and now an import duty over the span of three years.  The stability and
predictability of the policy environment are largely shaped by societal perceptions about
the role and function of private trade:  is taking advantage of spatial and temporal price
differences an acceptable role for traders, or is this a provocation to government that
works against state policy?
Of fundamental importance are the societal beliefs about the legitimacy of the economic
and political institutions.  What holds a democracy together is a general belief that the
system is legitimate and in some sense fair and open to change.  This belief follows from
socialization. The critical problem in many developing countries is that the losers of
political decisions decide to opt out of the system (Hirschman 1970).  The transfer of
government control is not accepted.  Those who are losers want to set up their own
system.  But fighting over the distribution of wealth destroys the wealth.
Education may be an essential factor in a large complex political economy.  Whether the
majority of society believes that (a) the role of government is to serve the people, or (b)
that winning control of the government is a means for channeling income to particular
groups is determined by education and socialization as well as history (which is always
interpreted through the lens of socialization).2627
5.  LOOKING TO THE FUTURE:  STRATEGIES TO STRENGTHEN THE
PRODUCTIVITY OF THE FOOD SYSTEM
A major goal of food policy is to reduce costs throughout the food system and promote structural
transformation.  This will involve technical innovation.  One should not conclude that Africa is
failing to utilize much of the agricultural production and marketing technologies being utilized in
many other parts of the world because these technical processes are inherently inappropriate in
Africa.  Rather, their adoption is constrained in some way by incompatibility with the current
structure of incentives and institutions.  Identifying the rules of the game restricting productive
investments and those providing increased security for private investment and innovation
represent low-cost, high-return public investments. What is least-cost depends upon the situation,
including the political support for development.
The most obvious constraint on development is the lack of resources (broadly defined).  It is clear
that productivity can be increased by improving transportation and communication infrastructure,
public health, education, research, extension, improved legal and police services etc. Even a
country committed to private enterprise and markets has to make choices, and that amounts to at
least an implicit strategy.  Part of the strategy in making the transition to a more productive
economy is to focus early on the low-cost,  high-pay-off investments.  To make an enterprise
system work, investing in developing the details of the rules of the economic game and a strategy
for public investments needs to be at the top of the list.
Refocusing the debate from economic liberalization to economic development within a market-
oriented system will require increased attention to the institutional details of the political
economy.  These institutional details, by defining rights, costs, and the incentives of market
participants, influence the patterns and rate of trade and investment that evolve.  Market
institutions thus influence both monetary and transaction costs, and hence the supply and demand
conditions in the market.  If the set of regulations does not adequately reduce uncertainties and
transaction costs, then markets break down or fail to develop.  Economic activity remains
characterized by semi-subsistence production, with low volumes of trade and low levels of
economic specialization.  A low proportion of production is traded in markets that may be
allocatively efficient but unable to reduce the risks and costs of investing in more productive
technologies and specialized production patterns.  The goal of policy should not focus so much on
eking out remaining efficiency gains from existing technology.  Rather, it should concentrate on
changing the incentive structure to maximize the rate of investment in new productivity-enhancing
technology that achieves broad-based increases in living standards.
With the reality of fiscal restrictions facing most African countries, there will be increased
emphasis in the foreseeable future on developing financially sustainable means of reducing the
risks in the agro-food system.  Such an approach will require increased reliance on market-
oriented mechanisms that exploit potential gains from local, regional and international trade.  But
economists will need to get beyond simply prescribing free markets, and become more specific
about which set of institutions should be promoted within a market economy.  As stated by
Bromley (1997, p.17), “there is no such thing as the market.  Rather, there are infinitely many28
ways of constructing [markets].”   Prescribing free markets is an incomplete thought (Schmid
1992).
Researchers working to support African development can make a contribution in both their
positive and normative analysis by enabling policymakers to understand how particular institutions
are likely to alter the performance of the newly emerging agricultural systems in Africa. 
Unfortunately, a universal set of prescriptions is impossible given the diverse history, cultural
norms, and existing institutions in each particular country setting.  Moreover, countries that adopt
the formal rules of another economy will have very different performance characteristics than the
first economy because of different informal norms and enforcement.  “Transferring the formal
political and economic rules of successful Western market economies to third-world and Eastern
European economies is not a sufficient condition for good economic performance” (North 1994,
p. 366).
However, what follows is a general set of guidelines to reduce the costs and risks of participating
in the food systems under most country conditions.
5.1  Improve Road, Rail, Port, and Communication Infrastructure
Governments must make this a priority.  Donor support in this area would make the market
liberalization measures they advocated more successful.  The dilemma is that improving transport
infrastructure is very costly.  Phased investments may be required which first target high potential
food and cash-crop regions where agricultural intensification is more likely to be financially
sustainable.  An improved market infrastructure also requires further policy change to remove
remaining import tariffs on vehicles and spare parts.
One important role for research is to identify where such infrastructure investments would have
the highest payoffs.  For example, by analyzing food production, consumption, and price
dispersion patterns in a country, researchers can provide insights into where investment in a road
would do the most to improve food security or increase production potential through raising farm
output prices and lowering farm input prices.  Given the high cost of such infrastructure
investments, such targeting is extremely important.
5.2  Invest More in Market-Oriented Agricultural Research
In market-oriented growth strategies, well tested and improved cultivars and management
practices for commodities for which there are viable markets, work synergistically with improved
input and output markets to create sustainable conditions for intensification and productivity
growth (Boughton et al. 1995; Oehmke and Crawford 1996). Yet national research budgets and
donor funding of technology development are in many cases declining.  Many national agricultural
research systems (NARS) still face problems of low salaries, dismal conditions of service for their
researchers, and continued shortages of operational funds. The history of agricultural research in
Uganda shows the impossibility of turning research off and on.  It takes only a short lapse in29
research support to result in massive losses in human and physical capital that requires painful and
expensive new investments to rebuild (Laker-Ojok 1996).  And despite claims that fertilizer/seed
technologies are on the shelf that can double or triple farm yields in Africa, there remains a dearth
of research on the profitability and riskiness of those technologies under farmers’ actual control,
and under current input and output market conditions or those foreseeable under alternative
sustainable input and output marketing arrangements.
The boundaries between production and marketing activities are becoming increasingly blurred as
the agricultural product specification becomes more complex.  For example, the rising importance
of biotechnology will create a variety of new functions in the vertical system for applying new
scientific discoveries toward practical use in the food and fiber system and working out
intellectual property rights for the product  (Zilberman, Yarkin, and Heiman 1997).  An
increasingly important role of the interrelated research, marketing, and legal systems is to work
out the details of use and exchange of information and knowledge.
5.3  Modify the State Marketing Boards’ Pricing Policies and Change External Trade
Policies to Promote Regional Trade
Pan-territorial and pan-seasonal prices, still continued in some African countries, clearly depress
private investment in transport and storage that could over the long-run play an important role in
improving market integration and mitigating food price fluctuations. And several states continue
to ban private import and/or export of grain, which impedes the potential to stabilize food
supplies and prices through intra regional trade.  But beyond the elimination of obvious regulatory
barriers to trade, cross-border trade will be enhanced by the state taking an active role in
developing the marketing institutions that reduce risks and transaction costs of contracting,
including the development of commodity exchanges to generate market information and allow for
contingent contracting and reputable fora for resolving contract disputes.  Infrastructural
development between countries would also facilitate incentives for regional trade, thereby
reducing the need for large national grain stockpiles that impose additional costs on the marketing
system.
5.4  Invest More to Nurture the Political, Legal and Economic Foundations of Private
Marketing Systems  
A well-functioning legal and political framework for market activity reduces the risks and
transaction costs of private trade.  Strengthened mechanisms for specifying and enforcing
contracts, raising the costs of contract noncompliance, and more pluralistic procedures for
developing the rules governing market activity are important adjuncts to developing reliable
markets, and inherently involve strengthening the regulatory abilities of the state rather than
“getting the state out of market regulation.”  In general, this means a reorientation of the state
from “control” activities to “facilitation” activities designed to reduce farmers’ and traders’ costs
of transacting across inputs, credit, and commodities.  Such an approach includes investing more
public resources to improve public market information and related market extension capabilities. 30
These will accelerate both private and public response to supply gluts and shortages in the short
run and help farmers and traders plan investments more effectively in the long run.  The timely
dissemination of market information can also help policymakers monitor the evolving effects of
market liberalization better, identify problems that require mid-course correction, and respond to
impending supply fluctuations in a more timely way.  Such an approach also includes more public
support for the development of fledgling commodity exchanges, which have the longer-run
potential  to improve the dissemination of market information, reduce search costs to link buyers
and sellers substantially, and lower supply and price risks through forward contracting and
hedging. 
5.5  Coordinate Policies and Investments to Gain Complementary Benefits from Higher-
Valued Cash and Food Crop Production  
In many areas of Africa, successful introduction/promotion to smallholders of high-valued cash
crops can have strategic spillover benefits that stimulate the same farmers’ food crop output (e.g.,
cotton in Burkina Faso, Mali and Mozambique).  High-valued crops can attract a range of input
and output marketing services into a region. While originally intended to meet the needs of cash
crop producers, these delivery systems also tend to increase the availability of inputs  for food
crops.  Also, revenue from cash crop sales can help to capitalize farmers and finance household
investment in animal traction equipment and other inputs that also promote both cash and food
crop productivity improvements.  Other important policies to stimulate cash and related food-crop
output involve clear rules and implementation of these so as to create incentives for foreign
private investments in agribusiness and processing activities.
5.6  Increase Business Skills Training and Related Support for Grass-Roots Farmer
Organizations 
While the benefits of existing farmer organizations have derived mainly from reducing the
transaction costs of acquiring and repaying credit through group schemes, these benefits can be
potentially extended into a broader range of input and output marketing activities.  For example,
in Mali, such organizations handle most of the bulking and initial grading of cotton and the
management of local savings and loan associations.  Future roles for farmer organizations include
greater involvement in the gathering and dissemination of market information, the diffusion of
technical advice, and the bulking of farmer surpluses to facilitate smallholder participation in local
and regional markets, thereby opening up a number of market-oriented mechanisms for reducing
the risks of price and supply instability.  
Moreover, there are very different economies of scale at various stages of the food system. 
Multinational firms may have certain advantages in international trade (acquiring fertilizer and
other inputs, hedging on futures markets, having a wider trade portfolio to reduce risks) and
accessing technologies from around the world.  But given the small size of most African markets,
such large firms are likely to have substantial market power and may not have incentives to pass
on all these benefits to smallholders.  The development of strong farmer groups may mitigate the     
13For example, in Mali the union of cotton farmers, the multinational cotton company, and the state are
all signatories to the contract-plan governing the management of the cotton subsector in the country and all
receive a share of the cotton company's profits.
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potential for actors at highly concentrated stages to exert market power to the detriment of
smallholder production growth.  Such organizations may even act as subcontractors or partners to
multinationals, thereby creating a system that captures the benefits of scale economies in
international trade while tailoring specific services to local farmers' conditions.
13
5.7  Invest in Local Analytical Capacity 
The payoffs to market reforms have been most effective when as part of the reform process, there
has been a concerted effort to strengthen domestic capacity for ongoing research and analysis to
inform the reform process.  Because of the paucity of data on food systems in most sub-Saharan
African (SSA) countries, most reforms are necessarily designed initially on the basis of scanty
empirical information.  The strengthening of domestic analysis capacity allows a mechanism for
ongoing monitoring of food system performance in response to the reforms and provides a
mechanism for mid-course corrections as researchers uncover new empirical information.  Given
the ongoing nature of the reforms, it is unlikely that outside consultants alone can assure the
continuity of monitoring, analysis and evaluation needed to help guide the reforms.
Lasting market and related policy change depends critically on governments’ actual belief in the
analysis supporting the reforms.  There is ample evidence that governments that have reluctantly
undertaken market reform programs have reversed them and reimposed the old system of price
and trade controls with the advent of drought or other shocks (Jayne and Jones 1997).  Local
analytical units are often seen as bringing more local knowledge to the analysis, being less
ideologically driven, and having greater sensitivity to domestic policy concerns than analysis
conceived and driven by donor interests using expatriate analysts.  At the same time, cooperative
analyses involving both local units and external researchers are often valued, as the involvement of
an internationally known research organization often gives local decision makers greater
confidence in the scientific soundness of the analysis.  The demand for, and credibility of, food
policy analysis to guide market development is enhanced by a collaborative research process
driven by local researchers and government analysts who take “ownership” of the research agenda
and findings.33
6.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Market policy reforms and technology development need to be viewed as different facets of the
same problem (Staatz 1994).  Policy-oriented marketing research will need to expand its emphasis
from the liberalization of markets to the identification of strategies that will give the incentives to
invest in new productive patterns of investment and exchange for the millions of low-input semi-
subsistence rural households in the region.  This implies a major role for future marketing research
in identifying institutional arrangements that can coordinate exchange of inputs, credit, and output
markets in a manner profitable to all system participants (including farmers).  These solutions will
be fundamentally country-specific, dependent upon the current set of market rules, property
rights, exchange arrangements, experience and perceptions derived from history, and
organizational structure in each country.  Promising areas for future research involve how to
create the incentives, through attention to the institutional underpinnings of markets, for
coordination between farmer organizations (accountable to farmers), multinational input and
commodity trading firms, a supportive public sector, and an expanded role for commodity
exchanges, forward contracting, and other mechanisms to reduce the costs and risks of investing
in the entire food system.  Finding workable strategies to implement these scenarios is likely to be
the key challenge for food marketing research in Africa well into the twenty-first century.35
ANNEX 1  
NOTES ON THE DATA
Value of crop output:  Output figures are derived from the FAO Crop Production Indices,
except for Zimbabwe, which uses smallholder crop output only, as derived from Ministry of
Agriculture (1997), to separate  smallholder production trends from the large-scale (mainly
European) sector.  FAO crop output data for various years was rescaled to world market prices
during the 1989-91 period.  Thus, the indices are in real terms and do not reflect variations in crop
price relatives or exchange rates over time.  The indices were then converted to agricultural gross
domestic product (GDP) in 1994 US$.
Land and labor:  The measures of labor and land are in physical units. The land variable is area
cultivated and under permanent crops, as reported by FAO, except for Zimbabwe, Senegal and
Ethiopia where actual area cultivated is used (based on Ministry of Agriculture (1997); FAO
(1997); and CSA (1997), respectively).  The labor variable is population in rural areas, as
reported by FAO.  This is an imperfect proxy for agricultural labor force; however, it is likely to
be highly correlated with rural population except in the event of shifts  in labor allocation between
farm and nonfarm activities over time.
Fertilizer use:   This variable is represented by total fertilizer consumed in the crop year (in
thousands of tons), as reported by FAO (1996).
Rainfall:   The measure of rainfall is the national average of the total annual precipitation for
numerous local rainfall stations, weighted by its long-term average.  The index is biased toward
agriculture, i.e., rainfall in the wettest areas is given a relatively higher weight than dry areas.  The
relevant annual period is determined in accordance with the crop cycle, and therefore differs from
country to country.  The data and methodology are drawn from Gommes and Petrassi (1994).
Reform:  Reform is modeled simply as a binary variable taking on a value of zero before the
initiation of significant sectoral reform and a value of one thereafter.  The initiation of significant
sectoral reforms for each country is considered as follows: Burkina Faso (1985); Ethiopia (1990);
Kenya (1989); Mali (1985); Senegal (1985); Zambia (1993); and Zimbabwe (1993).  Although de
jure reforms began earlier in some countries (e.g., the legislation abolishing the grain board's legal
monopoly in Mali was passed in 1981), the dates used are based on the authors' estimates of when
the reforms in fact began to be implemented.37
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